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Abstract—Incorrect implementations of network protocol mes-
sage specifications affect the stability, security, and cost of
network system development. Most implementation defects fall
into one of three categories of well defined message constraints.
However, the general process of constructing network protocol
stacks and systems does not capture these categorical con-
straints. We introduce a systems programming language with
new abstractions that capture these constraints. Safe and efficient
implementations of standard message handling operations are
synthesized by our compiler, and whole-program analysis is used
to ensure constraints are never violated. We present language
examples using the OpenFlow protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
The message handling layer of any network protocol is
notoriously difficult to implement correctly. Common errors
include: accepting or allowing the creation of malformed
messages, using incorrect byte ordering or byte alignment,
using undefined values, etc. (§ II). These defects lead to prob-
lems in stability, security, performance, and cost for network
systems. Table I, the result of a survey of the US-CERT
Vulnerability Database [7], demonstrates that sophisticated
organizations implementing mature protocols commit these
errors. The persistent introduction of these defects is not the
sign of an engineering problem, but a failure to use the correct
levels of abstraction when working with network protocols.
Message handling has been the focus of several research
efforts. When the wire-format of the message is not important,
serialization solutions can be used [15], [6]. However, with
network protocols, because of interoperability requirements,
adherence to the specific wire-format is necessary. As a result,
a series of Domain Specific Languages (DSLs) that allow
programmer control over the wire-format have been designed.
These approaches synthesize data structures to hold messages
and the typical operations necessary to manipulate them using
correct by construction techniques [10], [2], [12]. Language
researchers have improved upon these DSLs with rich type
systems that can prove certain safety properties, and address
some of the problems mentioned previously [4], [5]. Other
work developed static analysis techniques, that require no
domain knowledge, to survey existing code bases and find
occurrences of some of the previously mentioned defects [3].
This material is based upon work partially supported by by the AFOSR
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Systematically eliminating the categories of message related
defects requires rich type systems and whole program anal-
ysis, which is not supported by existing declarative DSLs.
Invariants and semantic information produced by the DSL is
not incorporated or used in program analysis by the target
language. Furthermore, finding all occurrences of message
related defects require some level of domain knowledge during
static analysis. This must either be built in to the language or
programmer specified in a way that resembles existing network
protocol specifications. Analysis by formal methods should
be a by-product of compiling the network program, and not
require any specialized knowledge by the programmer. Our
work-in-progress develops a systems programming language
to address these issues. This allows for full program analysis,
providing stronger safety guarantees and offering domain
specific optimization that is exceedingly difficult to accomplish
by hand or impossible with a DSL.
In this paper we clearly identify categories of message
related vulnerabilities by their structural and semantic con-
straints. We show that these categories are responsible for
known vulnerabilities, and using our tools we show that even
some live Internet traffic violates these constraints. We then
introduce a systems programming language that allows pro-
grammers to capture network protocol message structure and
constraints. The constraints allow the compiler to reason over
entire programs, identifying and eliminating the categories of
vulnerabilities mentioned before. Additionally, the choice of
a systems programming language allows for efficient code
generation. Throughout the paper we use OpenFlow [11] as
our reference protocol. Our contributions are:
• the identificaiton of three categories of network proto-
col vulnerabilities common in network programs and in
network traffic (in § II),
• the development of abstractions that prevent the construc-
tion of messages that lead to these vulnerabilities, and
unsafe access of conditional fields (in § II and § III),
TABLE I
MESSAGE RELATED VULNERABILITIES
Proto. Age Bug Date Vendor Error CERT #
802.11i 2004 2012 Broadcom semantic 160027
OSPFv2 1998 2012 Quagga struct 551715
NTPD 1985 2009 GNU struct 853097
ICMP 1981 2007 Cisco both 341288
VTP 1996 2006 Cisco semantic 821420
Bootp 1985 2006 Apple struct 776628
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• the design of a systems programming language that
eliminates unsafe protocol implementations through type
checking (in § III, § IV, and § V), and
• the implementation of a compiler and library supporting
the language (in § VI).
II. MESSAGE VULNERABILITIES
There are three categories of message vulnerabilities that we
address: structural constraint violation, semantic constraint vi-
olation, and unsafe access of conditional fields. In this section
we describe these categories in detail with examples using
the OpenFlow v1.0 protocol [11]. We first briefly describe the
protocol and then show vulnerability examples.
version type length
xid
Payload(type)
1 - 1.0
2 - 1.1
3 - 1.2
4 - 1.3
0 - HELLO
…
14 - FLOW_MOD
...
Version(s) Type(s)
HELLO
FLOW_MOD
...
...
0
14
32 bits
0x00
0x04
0x08
...
Fig. 1. OpenFlow Message Format
Figure 1 summarizes the message format, or representation,
of an OpenFlow message. A message consists of a fixed
8 byte header followed by a variable sized payload. The
header indicates the version of the OpenFlow protocol, the
type of the payload, the length of the entire message, and a
transaction identifier used to match response messages to their
requests. The payload can be one of 22 types in version 1.0.
This protocol was designed to operate over stream-oriented
transports, which are more difficult to handle than datagram
or message oriented transports. Streams have no concept of
message boundaries and can give the program anything from
a single byte to several messages in a single read. It is the
programmer’s responsibility, not the transport’s, to determine
where the payload ends and the next message begins.
Semantic constraints ensure that a message field’s value
has a defined meaning in the protocol. For instance, in Open-
Flow 1.0 the domain of the version field is [1, 1], the domain
of the type field is [0, 21], the domain of the length field is
[8, 216 − 1], and the domain of the xid field is [0, 232 − 1].
Any value that is not in the domain of its field is semantically
invalid; it has no meaning in the protocol definition. Violating
a semantic constraint is similar to using undefined behavior
in a programming language. As Table I shows, constraint
violations lead to vulnerabilities.
Structural constraints address how messages are con-
structed and used by a program. Messages are constructed
in two ways: either by a program to send over a network, or
from the network to send to the program. In both cases it is
important to construct only structurally valid messages.
These constraints deal with the number of bytes a message
occupies in buffers used to communicate with the network.
Structural constraint testing is the process of ensuring there
are enough bytes to complete the operation of constructing a
message from a buffer, or filling a buffer with a well-formed
message. For example, any buffer containing less than 8 bytes
cannot possibly represent a valid OpenFlow message and any
attempt to interpret that buffer as a message, would be an error.
Semantic constraint violations can lead to structural con-
straint violations. Reading from a stream can produce a buffer
containing several messages. The header of the first message
must be contained in the first 8 bytes, and the payload must
end at the position where the header’s length field indicates.
In the header, the length field can be semantically invalid, but
because it is used to constrain the payload’s size, it becomes a
structural constraint violation as well. A similar problem arises
with a semantically invalid type field that is used to choose
the payload.
Safe access ensures that fields with run-time dependency
are always validated before use. Many fields in OpenFlow are
dependent; their meaning is determined by the values of previ-
ously encountered fields. For example, there is a dependency
between the payload of a message and the header’s type field.
A structurally and semantically valid Hello message cannot
have its payload treated as the FlowMod type without invoking
undesired behavior.
III. LANGUAGE
This work builds on fundamental notions from system pro-
gramming [8], [14], from structured generic programming, and
mathematical programming languages such as AXIOM [9],
and Liz [13]. This work, heavily inspired by the Liz language,
aims to support simple, safe, and efficient handling of network
protocol messages. The core of our language supports values,
references, constants, functions, records, a minimal set of
expressions, and follows Call-By-Value semantics. We do not
expose pointers to the users of the language and drastically
restrict heap allocation to certain language built-in types.
Figure 2 shows the abstract syntax of the language. The
dependent types ω, are a primary contribution of this paper.
Our language captures the structural and semantic con-
straints of a message with user-defined type and variable decla-
rations. We then enforce these constraints through the process
of object and symbolic construction. If object construction
completes successfully, then structural constraints are upheld,
if symbolic construction completes successfully, then semantic
constraints hold. Using construction to establish invariants is
a common way to reason about program behavior.
An object, or instance of a type, must be constructed before
use. The process of object construction involves allocating
space where the object will live, and initializing its values to
establish its invariant. Symbolic construction extends object
construction to include ensuring the value of the object is
consistent with its symbolic constructor. Upon completion of
construction, an object is well-formed and its invariant has
been established.
The ω types, see Figure 2, allow user definition of
precise structural and semantic constraints. Structural con-
straints can be explicitly stated by the specifiers: bits(e), and
constraint(e). Structural constraints are otherwise implicit
in the type, which will be explained below. Semantic con-
τ := unit | bool | byte | char | int
| uint | string | const(τ)
| ref(τ) | τ→ τ | type | Buffer | View | ω
spec := bits(e) | constraint(e)
xform := msbf | lsbf
ω := uint(spec[, xform]) | array(τ, e)
| vector(τ) | record{decl}
| variant{τ if e}
e := c | x | e.x | e‘[’e‘]’ | x(e)) | return(e)
| if(e)then(e)else(e) | while(e)e | block
block := {decl|e}
func := x(decl) : τ = block
decl := x : τ[‘|’e][= e]
toplevel := decl|func
Fig. 2. Core Language Syntax
straints are introduced through the declaration syntax. Any
declaration can impose a semantic constraint through the
use of the bar, |, followed by a guard expression. These
declarations provide constraint information to the compiler
that is used in full program analysis. This allows the compiler
to reason about both constraint satisfaction and safe usage.
The following is a short summary of the ω types:
• uint(spec[, xform]) defines an unsigned integer that has
a precise bit width specified by its structural constraint
(spec). Optionally, the type also takes a transform param-
eter (xform) that allows for non-native representation
of the data. For instance, a protocol may specify that
a value’s representation is Most Significant Byte First
(MSBF) and 1’s complement.
• array(τ, e) and vector(τ) types allow for sequences of
objects of type τ. The array is statically sized to contain
e elements, while the vector has a dynamic size.
• record{decl} is a sequence of declarations, whose ob-
jects can be accessed by field name. There is no padding,
alignment, or meta-data applied to the object by the
compiler. If padding, alignment, or meta-data is desired,
the programmer can explicitly declare them as fields.
Additionally, the order of fields is preserved.
• variant{τ if e} is a union of types where each type is
guarded by a predicate. A variant is constructed by eval-
uating the predicate set and invoking the constructor of
the corresponding true predicate. A variant is uninitialized
until evaluation of the predicate set.
Figure 3 demonstrates how to declare types corresponding
to the OpenFlow header, payload, and message. The header is
a simple record of four fields, all of which have constant speci-
fiers, and follow MSBF ordering. The payload type is a unique
choice of types based on a type parameter. For the values in
the header to have semantic meaning in version 1.0 of the
define Hdr:type = record {
vrsn: uint(bits(8));
type: uint(bits(8));
len: uint(bits(16), msbf);
xid: uint(bits(32), msbf);
}
define Pld(x:uint):type = variant {
Hello if x == 0;
...
FlowMod if x == 14;
...
}
define valid_hdr(h:cref(Hdr)):bool = {
return h.vrsn == 1
and h.len >= bytes(h);
}
define Msg:type = record {
hdr: Hdr | valid_hdr;
pld: Pld(hdr.type,
constraint(hdr.len - bytes(hdr)));
}
Fig. 3. OpenFlow v1.0 Message Declaration
OpenFlow protocol we have to constrain their values. This is
achieved with the semantic constraint valid_hdr, which must
first be defined as a function that takes a constant reference
to a header and returns bool. Message is defined as a record
including a header with version 1.0 semantic constraints, and a
payload that is parameterized over the header’s type field and
constraint. All type constructors, with the exception of uint
and array allow for an optional specifier constraint. In this
particular case, construction of Pld is not to exceed the result
of the constraint hdr.len− bytes(hdr).
Buffer & View are abstractions over the underlying ma-
chine architecture that help the compiler ensure structural con-
straints are never violated. Reading from a file or socket results
in a buffer with begin and end boundaries surrounding the
bytes received. View is a mechanism that restricts visibility
into a Buffer. The set of operations defined for Buffer and
View are:
• view: returns a view of an entire buffer
• available: returns the byte size of a view
• advance: returns a view with an advanced head
• constrain: returns a view with a constrained tail
• put: writes a value to a view
• get: reads a value from a view
Buffer
View
msg msg msg
View
constrain
Fig. 4. Constraining a View limits the number of bytes available for access
Figure 4 illustrates a buffer returned from a read system call
against a TCP socket. A single read has resulted in more than
one protocol message. The initial view wraps all of the data;
however, the first few bytes of the view contain a protocol
header, which provides the length of the first message. This
length is then used to constrain the visibility to precisely one
message. The constrain operation supports use of datagram
and stream oriented transports, while also providing safety
boundaries for object construction.
IV. COMPILER SYNTHESIS
Programmers continue to make mistakes implementing mes-
sage operations that are necessary in all protocols such as those
mentioned in § I and § VI. Our strategy is to eliminate the
need to write these common operations by having the compiler
synthesize safe and efficient versions. All user-defined type
definitions contain structural and semantic constraints. This
information is sufficient to synthesize the following operations:
• construction: constructs an object from expressions
• copy_construction: constructs an object from another
• assignment: copies an object’s state into another
• bytes: returns the number of bytes of an object
• to_view: writes an object to a view
• from_view: constructs an object from a view
• equal, not_equal: compare objects for equivalence
• to_string: returns a string representation of the object
The remainder of this section will describe the synthesis
process for a small subset of the above operations focusing on
synthesis and constraint validation for bytes and from_view.
Bytes is the name of the operation for determining the byte
size of any object. The operation bytes is synthesized for each
declared ω type in a program. For uint it returns the number
of bytes indicated by the specifier. For array it returns the
result of sizeof(T)∗elements, where T is the type contained
by the array. For objects of type Vector, bytes is not a
constant expression. It has run-time dependencies and returns
the accumulation of calling bytes over its elements. Record
returns the sum of calling bytes over its constituent fields,
and is only a constant if all of its fields are also constant.
Calling bytes over a variant returns 0 if the variant is
uninitialized, or it proxies the call to the contained object.
Figure 5 illustrates the process just described in pseudo code.
Several other synthesized operations depend on bytes.
Structural constraint violations must be prevented during
object construction. There are only three ways to violate a
structural constraint: overflowing a view, underflowing a view,
or constructing an invalid variant. Overflowing a view involves
advancing the view beyond the number of bytes contained.
Underflowing a view involves constraining a view by more
bytes than contained. Constructing an invalid variant is caused
when none of the variant’s contained type predicates evaluate
to true.
In order to construct the OpenFlow header the size of
the view must be at least as large as the number of bytes
of the header, or 8 bytes. During object construction the
view is always advanced by the size in bytes of the object.
Constructing the message object from a view of 7 or less bytes
would result in a view overflow.
The OpenFlow protocol indicates the length of a message
with the header length field. This value is used to constrain the
view for payload construction. It is possible, through accident
or malicious intent, for the length field to be inconsistent with
define bytes(u : uint(bits(v), f)) : uint = {
return v/8;
}
define bytes(a : cref array(T,x)) : uint = {
return sizeof(T) * x;
}
define bytes(v : cref vector(T) : uint = {
accum : uint = 0;
foreach(item in v) {
accum += bytes(v);
}
return accum;
}
define bytes(r : cref record) : uint = {
return bytes(r.x1)+bytes(r.x2)+...+bytes(r.xN);
}
define bytes(v : cref variant) : uint = {
if(not init(v))
return 0;
switch(v.kind) {
case variant::K1 => return bytes(T1(v.value));
case variant::K2 => return bytes(T2(v.value));
...
case variant::KN => return bytes(TN(v.value));
}
}
Fig. 5. Synthesis rules for the bytes operation
the amount of data actually sent. If the field indicated less than
8 bytes of payload it could be possible to underflow the view.
The value used to construct the variant payload is in the
header. Again, either through accident or malicious intent, it is
possible for the header to indicate a type which will not result
in valid variant construction. Using a variant in an invalid way
will result in undefined behavior.
Object construction is possible with either a construc-
tor that operates over expressions or using the from_view
operation. Figure 6 illustrates pseudo code for synthesizing
from_view. The operation returns false when a structural
constraint has been violated. Failure indicates a partially
constructed object. For simple types, such as uint and array,
the structural constraints are always checked. If there are
not enough bytes in the view to complete the operation, the
operation fails. Otherwise, the object’s value is constructed by
reading from the view. If a xform is present the object’s value
is updated using the specified transform. Finally, the view is
advanced by the size of the object just constructed.
The vector version of from_view operates in a greedy
fashion, it will consume the entire view. If this behavior is
not desired the view must be constrained before construction.
As long as there are bytes in the view the vector will attempt to
construct an object. Upon success, the object is inserted into
the vector and the process repeats. The record version will
attempt to construct its constituent fields and either return at
the first failure or succeed. The variant must guard against
the third type of structural constraint; it must be initialized
to a valid type. If this is not true then from_view will fail,
otherwise from_view is called over the appropriate type.
Symbolic construction ensures that all run-time type de-
pendencies must be propagated and semantic constraints are
inserted into synthesized code. The OpenFlow message from
Figure 3 has semantic constraints, a run-time type dependency,
and a constrained view. The semantic constraint turns into a
predicate check immediately after the call to from_view of
the header. If the check fails, the operation immediately returns
define from_view(v:ref(view), u:uint(bits(v),f)):bool={
if (available(v) < bytes(u))
return false;
get(v, u);
u = f(u);
advance(v, bytes(u));
return true;
}
define from_view(v:ref(view), a:ref(array(T,e))):bool={
if (available(v) < bytes(a))
return false;
foreach(x in a) {
from_view(v, x);
}
return true;
}
define from_view(v:ref(view), vc:ref(vector(T))):bool={
while(available(v) > 0) {
t:T;
if (not from_view(v, t))
return false;
push(vc, t);
}
return true;
}
define from_view(v:ref(view), r:ref(record)):bool={
if (not from_view(v, r.x1))
return false;
if (not from_view(v, r.x2))
return false;
...
return from_view(v, r.xN);
}
define from_view(v:ref(view), vr:ref(variant)):bool={
if(not init(vr))
return false;
switch(vr.kind) {
case vr::K1 => return from_view(v, T1(vr.value));
case vr::K2 => return from_view(v, T2(vr.value));
...
case vr::KN => return from_view(v, TN(vr.value));
}
}
Fig. 6. Synthesis rules for the from_view operation
define from_view(v:ref(view), m:Msg):bool = {
if(not from_view(v,m.hdr)) return false;
if(not valid_hdr(m.hdr)) return false;
if(not construct(m.pld, m.hdr)) return false;
return from_view(constrain(v,m.hdr.len-bytes(m.hdr)),
m.pld);
}
Fig. 7. Synthesis of from_view for Msg
with failure. Next, the type parameter must be checked and
initialized before the call to from_view over the payload. The
check ensures that failure happens if the value is undefined,
and if upon success initializes the payload’s kind. Finally, the
constrained view operation is propagated. The result of this
final step is shown in Figure 7.
V. SAFETY AND OPTIMIZATION
There are only three ways to violate structural constraints:
view underflow, view overflow, and reading or writing from
an uninitialized variant. These three categories of mistakes
can be identified with two simple invariants. If the bytes
of a view are always non-negative then it is impossible to
underflow or overflow the view. If a read or write of a variant is
always preceded by a valid initialization then the third category
is also impossible. The compiler uses a dataflow analysis
framework to prove that these invariants always hold or fail
the compilation of the program with useful error messages.
The goal of the compiler is to synthesize safe and efficient
code. The synthesis algorithm described previously will pro-
duce safe but inefficient code. The operations to_view and
from_view contain fine-grained guards that protect against
view underflow and overflow. These fine-grained guards are
the source of inefficiency. For example, it is better to have a
single guard over a sequence of objects of constant size, then
to have a guard over each object. We call this guard fusing, it
is analogous to fusing basic blocks to form larger basic blocks.
It is also useful to lift guards from inside the called function
to the call site. By lifting guards to the call site, potential
guard fusing optimization becomes possible. The optimization
strategy that we follow is a set of fusing and lifting rounds
that reduce the number of guards and form the largest possible
object construction basic blocks for to_view and from_view.
All synthesized operations have a similar Call Sequence
Graph (CSG). Figure 8 illustrates the generalized CSG for a
Flow Modification message. Each node represents a function
in the call sequence, the function types are indicated by
the node shape in the figure. This CSG is used to both
synthesize operation definitions and analyze safe usage of
messages. Guards start at the leaves of the graph and are lifted
to their parent nodes. If all guards can be fused within an
interior node, then the new guard is lifted and the process
is repeated. This process ensures guards covering the largest
possible constant sized objects are performed, additionally this
process is unaware of protocols and will optimize across layer
boundaries. Sometimes a node can have more than one parent
node, where the parents have differing behaviors. In this case,
we split the node into two versions where we lift the guard
when it is contained within a constant structure, or leave it in
place otherwise.
record
variant
vector
uint
Match
Flow_Mod
Action
Action_Hdr
Action_Payload
Header
Message
Fig. 8. Flow Modification Control Flow Graph
Code generation takes place after the optimization phase.
We currently support C++11 as our target language. All
message related type definitions and synthesized operations
will be written to a single set of .cpp and .hpp files, the
program itself is written to main.cpp.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Protocol implementations that send messages that are either
structurally or semantically invalid exist. Applying this work
we were able to discover structural constraint violations in
packet traces from core Internet routers. Furthermore, we
were able to define three categories of message constraints,
and show violation of these constraints can lead to high
profile vulnerabilities. Network programs must always handle
messages in a safe manner. To this aim, we developed a
systems programming language and library for writing safe
efficient network programs.
The language implementation was originally developed
as a C++11 library. The library was used to test ideas and
guide the language design. However, in order to enforce safety
guarantees with optimization a compiler was necessary. We
experimented with the language using two types of network
programs: a protocol analyzer, and an OpenFlow stack. This
set of applications provided good coverage over the diversity
of protocol formats and their constraints.
Core Internet traces were obtained from Caida [1] as test
data for packet analyzers written in our new language facilities.
The traffic was recorded from high speed interfaces, OC-192
(up to 10Gbps). Only the Layer 3 and Layer 4 headers, timing,
and summary information are present. The layer 3 addresses
were randomized and the layer 4 payloads were removed for
anonymization purposes. Each trace has between 500 MB and
1 GB of data and was timestamped in minute intervals. We
analyzed a 10 minute segment of traces from October of 2012.
We focused on looking for structural and value constraints
violations within IPv4, IPv6, TCP, and UDP. Table II shows
that we found structural constraint violations in all but one
protocol; no semantic constraint violations were found. IPv4
violated its structural constraint with regards to IPv4 Options.
The values in the Internet Header Length (IHL) field indicated
a number of Options that should be constructed; however, this
packet would overflow its view, the received block of data was
too small. The TCP and UDP structural constraint violations
were of the same nature; they violated the basic constraint of
a minimum sized header.
TABLE II
CAIDA TRACES
Desc. IPv4 IPv6 TCP UDP #
Count 247,849,217 130,760 221,243,574 23,633,921
CDF 99.95% 0.05% 89.22% 9.53%
Struct 16 0 84,274 86,123
The source of these structural constraint violations is not
currently known. It could be evidence of unintentional errors
in sending devices, it could be maliciously crafted packets,
or it could be due to the collection process of the trace data.
However, regardless of the source, structural constraints have
been violated and these packets should not be admitted to safe
network programs.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Incorrect implementations of protocol message specifica-
tions affect the stability of network systems and potentially
lead to vulnerabilities. In this paper we identified three cate-
gories of constraints that can be used either to test whether a
message is well-formed or to generate safe code. We developed
a systems programming language that allowed user-defined
types to capture these constraints as well as a reasoning frame-
work to ensure these constraints are always upheld within the
users program. We presented example type definitions and
compiler synthesized code using the OpenFlow 1.0 protocol.
The next steps for this work fall into two categories:
extending the ω types and formalizing the meta-system.
Extending the type system will allow for the support of more
protocols. Vectors will be extended to support termination
predicates as a structural constraint parameter, this will al-
low for self-terminating sequences such as null-terminated
character strings. Generalized enumerations will be added as
an easier mechanism for restricting values used in message
construction. Finally, work on the meta-system is focused on
generating proof certificates that can be used for mechanical
verification of safety.
REFERENCES
[1] The CAIDA Anonymized 2012 Internet Traces - 20120119-125903, kc
claffy, Dan Andersen, Paul Hick.
[2] G. Back. Datascript- a specification and scripting language for binary
data, 2002.
[3] J. Condit, M. Harren, Z. Anderson, D. Gay, and G. Necula. Dependent
types for low-level programming. Programming Languages and Systems,
pages 520–535, 2007.
[4] K. Fisher and R. Gruber. PADS: a domain-specific language for
processing ad hoc data. SIGPLAN Not., 40(6):295–304, June 2005.
[5] K. Fisher, Y. Mandelbaum, and D. Walker. The next 700 data description
languages. SIGPLAN Not., 41(1):2–15, January 2006.
[6] Google. Protocol buffers, 2012. http://code.google.com/p/protobuf/.
[7] US Government. United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team,
2012.
[8] International Organization for Standards. International Standard
ISO/IEC 14882. Programming Languages — C++, 2nd edition, 2003.
[9] R. D. Jenks and R. S. Sutor. AXIOM: The Scientific Computation System.
Springer-Verlag, 1992.
[10] P. J. McCann and S. Chandra. Packet types: abstract specification
of network protocol messages. In Proceedings of the conference on
Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer
Communication, SIGCOMM ’00, pages 321–333, New York, NY, USA,
2000. ACM.
[11] N. McKeown, T. Anderson, H. Balakrishnan, G. Parulkar, L. Peterson,
J. Rexford, S. Shenker, and J. Turner. Openflow: enabling innovation
in campus networks. SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., 38(2):69–74,
March 2008.
[12] R. Pang, V. Paxson, R. Sommer, and L. Peterson. binpac: a yacc for
writing application protocol parsers. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM
SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, IMC ’06, pages 289–
300, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[13] G. Dos Reis. A System for Axiomatic Programming. In AISC/MKM/-
Calculemus, pages 295–309, 2012.
[14] Alexander A Stepanov and Paul McJones. Elements of programming.
Addison-Wesley Professional, 2009.
[15] International Telecommunication Union. Abstract syntax
notation one (ASN.1). Technical report, 2002. Available from:
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-
0207.pdf.
